

TOP SECRET

2 February 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE DIRECTOR'S FILES

SUBJECT: Responsibility for Peace-Time Planning for the War-Time Conduct of Overt Psychological Warfare

Since the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council issued a memo on February 1, 1949, "Responsibilities for Peace-Time Planning for the War-Time Conduct of Overt Psychological Warfare," giving three alternatives to be decided by the National Security Council as mentioned in paragraph 7 of my memo of January 25, 1949 on this subject, you may wish to file with your copy of the memo from the National Security Council, dated February 1, the following copy of my January 25th memo:

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Responsibility for Peace-Time Planning for the War-Time Conduct of Overt Psychological Warfare

1. You will recall that on December 28, 1948 a draft of a NSC Staff "Memorandum for the National Security Council" on the above subject was sent to the Consultants, as this subject was covered neither in NSC 10/2 nor in NSC 4.

2. With the exception of the Air Force member, the NSC Staff recommended that this peace-time planning for war-time overt psychological warfare be placed within the State Department, which is conducting the peace-time overt (Annex A of the December 28 draft). The Air Force, however, wished to set up a nucleus organization responsible directly to the NSC (Annex B of the December 28 draft).

3. Now the Army has submitted, on December 31st, a proposed Annex C, giving this job to CIA's Office of Policy Coordination.

4. I have talked this matter over with Messrs. Wisner and [] since this suggestion is different from CIA's policy established many months ago when CIA took the stand that present day operators should be the planners for similar war-time operations.

5. When the Army officer drafting Annex C asked OPC if it was "violently opposed", OPC answered that it was not "violently opposed" to Annex C -- believing in the right of freedom of speech and that the Army was entitled to its opinion on this subject. However, OPC did

TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET

not, and does not, seek this job. It does not want this job as it has higher priorities in other fields and Annex C offers mechanical difficulties. Of course, if ordered to take it, OPC would do the best it could.

6. Unless you disapprove, I shall give the above information to the NSC Staff when next we meet so that its members may use this information if they wish in their briefings. (Heretofore the Air Force was the only one opposed to giving this job to State.) It is not now known whether the Army will persuade the Navy to support its plan outlined in Annex C.

7. Since under pressure of the Air Force, the NSC Staff agreed to send the two alternate plans A and B to the Security Council for decision. Presumably we shall now have to add this third alternative. I assume you will have an opportunity when the Security Council is considering these plans by voting slip or at a meeting to express your opinion on Annex C.

PRESGOTT CHILDS

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

25 January 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE DIRECTOR

Subject: Responsibility for Peace-Time Planning For The War-Time
Conduct of Overt Psychological Warfare

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2. With the exception of the Air Force member, the NSC Staff recommended that this peace-time planning for war-time overt psychological warfare be placed within the State Department, which is conducting the peace-time overt (Annex A of the December 28 draft). The Air Force, however, wished to set up a nucleus organization responsible directly to the NSC (Annex B of the December 28 draft).

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TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

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*Feb 17 NSC Meeting approved Annex A
of Feb 1 Minus Memo herewith*

TOP SECRET

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29 December 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE DIRECTOR

Subject: Peace Time Planning for War Time Conduct of Overt
Psychological Warfare

1. The NSC Staff paper on peace time planning for war time conduct of overt psychological warfare is coming to the Consultants today asking the NSC to decide whether this nucleus organization should be (a) within the Department of State, or (b) in a separate outfit directly responsible to the NSC.

2. It has with it two Annexes. Annex (A) is the one prepared by and preferred by all of the Staff except the Air Force. Annex (B) was prepared in the Department of the Air Force and not amended or changed in any way by the Staff.

3. The Air Force objected so constantly to labeling their Annex (B) as their product and the Annex (A) as the product of all other members of the Staff that this fact is merely being pointed out in the "briefings" given in the other Departments.

4. The consensus of opinion among the Staff is (except for the Air Force) that Annex (B) is tripe. To us it merely indicates that the JANC Subcommittee Psychological Warfare boys have been practicing what they preach on the Air Force.

PRESCOTT CHILDS
Chief, ICAPS

TOP SECRET

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21 October 1948

MEMORANDUM TO: Acting Director of Central Intelligence

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SUBJECT: Information Program

1. The NSC Staff paper based on State's proposal, and considerable discussion, to fill in the gap of NSC L about planning now for overt psychological operations in time of war, will be over today, enroute the Consultants.

2. In suggesting the planning nucleus, there is provision for CIA "representation" on this planning staff along with Army, Navy, Air and Resources Board. Presumably, it will be run by the State Department, somewhere in George Allen's office, and that the Block Committee, as such, will then be discontinued.

3. I see no great need for CIA participation, certainly not full time, on such a planning staff, which is to consider only overt operations in time of war. The NSC Staff, thought, however, that there should be a tie in, because CIA is presumably planning for covert operations in time of war. As I recall it, the only "consultants" in the new paper will be Defense and State, as much of its language is derived from NSC 10/2.

PRESCOTT CHILDS
CHIEF, ICAPS


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Recommendations of
SANACC Subcommittee for Special Studies and Evaluations
(on its own initiative)

Re: NSC Proposal?

1. In view of the fact that the proposed NSC paper recommends that this Subcommittee be abolished when the steps contemplated in the paper are implemented, and
2. Because such recommendations, if approved, would negate the effectiveness of any current work of the Subcommittee,
3. Accordingly, it is the recommendation of the SANACC Subcommittee for Special Studies and Evaluations that it cease all deliberations until this whole problem is clarified.


Shane MacCarthy

TOP SECRET